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ABSTRACT 
 
Escalation of commitment emerged as a major explanation for the propensity of management 
information systems projects to exceed time and budget constraints. Earlier studies demonstrated 
that escalation in MIS is a common event.  This study presents a meta-analysis of the various 
theories of escalation that allows for integration of the various escalation factors into a model of 
irrational escalation and a model of rational escalation. The implications of rational and 
irrational escalation for the decision making in management of information systems are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
scalation of commitment is a phenomenon that involves continued commitment of resources to a 
project after the decision maker receives negative feedback about the project’s performance (Brockner, 
1992). There is a great deal of attention paid to the study of escalation of commitment in the 
management literature. The seminal study of escalation by Staw (1976) introduced the concept of self-justification 
as an explanation to escalation of commitment. In this study agents with high personal responsibility for the project 
were more likely to escalate after getting negative feedback about the project due to the need to justify the original 
decision in order to appear capable or competent to complete a task. Staw (1981) concludes that escalation is a 
common event and that “individuals have the tendency to become locked in to a course of action, throwing good 
money after bad or committing new resources to a losing course of action.”  
 
Escalation has been linked to significant losses due to project failures and delays in the area of management 
information systems (MIS). A report by the Standish Group (2004) collected project completion statistics on over 
40,000 MIS projects over the period from 1994 to 2004, and concluded that fifteen percent of MIS projects are 
cancelled while over fifty percent exhibit significant time and cost overruns. The report estimated that losses due to 
lost value and cost overruns in these MIS projects reached $55 billion in the U.S. in 2004. A number of case studies 
of escalation detail the extent of the losses that may be associated with escalated projects. Monteleagre and Keil 
(2000) discuss the development of an automated baggage handling system for the Denver International Airport. This 
project faced numerous instances of negative feedback, and was completed 16 months behind schedule and $2 
billion over budget. In another example, the Statewide Automated Child Support System (SACSS) developed in 
California from 1992 faced a number of negative signals over five years after it was started (Newcombe, 1998; Keil, 
Mann and Rai, 2000). The project was ultimately cancelled following $100 million in direct spending and $345 
million in various reported costs. Keil, Mann and Rai (2000) report that between 30 and 40 percent of all MIS 
projects demonstrate some degree of escalation.  
 
While escalation of commitment is a general phenomenon that can occur with any type of project, several 
studies (Zmud, 1980; DeMarco, 1982, Abdel-Hamid, 1988) suggest that MIS projects are particularly prone to 
escalation. Table 1 presents a meta-analysis of the existing studies of escalation relevant to the MIS literature. Case 
studies of escalation in MIS have been provided by Keil (1995) and Drummond (1994), among others. Escalation 
research has identified a number of factors that can cause managers to become entrapped in failing course of action, 
and provided a number of sequential process theories (Mahring & Keil, 2008). However, there is no clear distinction 
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between the rational and the irrational determinants of escalation. In general, the managerial literature views 
escalation as an irrational process that reduces the value of a project to the firm due to the influence of psychological 
and organizational factors such as self-justification. In contrast, economic research attempts to identify factors that 
make the escalation decision rational for either the decision maker or the firm. Such economic factors as the value of 
the real options embedded in a project (Tiwana et al., 2006) or the value of sequential investigation of projects 
quantified by the bandit process theory (Chulkov and Desai, 2005) may make escalation the optimal course of action 
for the firm. Agency theory demonstrates that escalation may be suboptimal for the firm, but optimal for the 
manager in the presence of asymmetric information and the principal-agent conflict of interest. Stopping a project 
may damage the reputation of the manager in charge of the project, which provides incentives to continue failing 
projects in this setting. This study performs a meta-analysis of escalation research and summarizes the findings in 
two models of escalation – the irrational escalation model, and the rational escalation model. The antecedents and 
the implications of these two models for the management of information system (IS) and information technology 
(IT) projects differ and are discussed in this study. 
 
META-ANALYSIS OF ESCALATION STUDIES 
Table 1: Meta-Analysis of Research in Escalation of Commitment 
Theory Source Findings Summary of Implications 
Self – 
Justification 
Theory 
Staw, 1976 Decision makers are motivated to rectify past 
losses and attempt to rationalize their actions or 
psychologically defend themselves against an 
apparent error in judgment.  Internal self-
justification causes an individual to desire “to 
restore consistency between the consequences of 
his actions and a self-concept of rational decision-
making” (Staw, 1976). External self-justification 
involves the need of a decision maker to appear 
rational in his or her decisions to other 
stakeholders such as supervisors. 
Self-justification is the 
primary explanation for 
escalation of commitment. 
Self-justification promotes 
escalation when the same 
decision-maker is responsible 
for making the project 
selection and the project 
continuation decisions. 
Rotation of duties and 
monitoring may alleviate this 
factor. 
Norms for 
Consistency 
 
Staw, 1981 
Staw and Ross, 
1980 
 
Staw (1981) argues that consistent administrators 
are viewed as better leaders.   
Staw and Ross’s (1980) experimental study 
suggests that such norms for consistency are 
strongest among practicing administrators and 
business students.  
 
Staw (1981) suggests that the 
perception that consistent 
managers are stronger may be 
acquired through 
socialization in business roles 
leading to the proneness to 
escalation among decision-
makers. 
Organizational 
Inertia 
Brockner, 1992 Brockner (1992) discusses the application of 
organizational inertia theories to escalation. With 
organizational inertia, even when the need to 
terminate a project is recognized, it is not acted 
upon immediately. 
With organizational inertia 
the need to stop an escalating 
project is recognized, but the 
organization is incapable of 
swift action. 
Prospect 
Theory 
Whyte, 1986 
 
Prospect theory (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979) 
provides an alternative to self-justification 
processes. Under the prospect theory, individuals 
exhibit risk-averse behavior when the decision is 
framed positively, and risk-seeking behavior when 
the decision is framed negatively. It implies that 
the negative framing of decision as a choice 
between losses may induce investment decisions 
that are irrational for a risk-averse or risk-neutral 
decision maker.  
Prospect theory unlike self-
justification, suggests that the 
framing of decision is critical 
in promoting escalation. 
Personal responsibility for 
the original selection is not 
required under prospect 
theory. 
 
Sunk Cost 
Effect 
Arkes and Blumer, 
1985 
Garland, 1990 
 
The sunk cost effect is the propensity of managers 
to continue funding for a project when a large 
amount of money has already been committed to 
the project. The sunk cost effect is closely relate 
Sunk cost effect may promote 
escalation when large 
amounts of sunk spending are 
involved.  
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Garland, Sandefur, 
Rogers, 1990 
to escalation. A major explanation for the sunk 
cost effect is the prospect theory.  As withdrawal 
from a course of action may lead to the sunk costs 
being viewed as a certain loss, the decision 
makers become more reluctant to withdraw as 
sunk costs increase. 
 
Experimental evidence is presented that strong 
negative feedback and professional experience 
may reduce sunk cost effect. 
Approach 
Avoidance 
Theory 
Rubin and 
Brockner, 1975 
 
Brockner and 
Rubin, 1985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conlon and 
Garland, 1993 
Escalation may be presented as an instance of 
approach avoidance conflict. Under approach 
avoidance theory, escalation behavior results 
when driving forces that encourage persistence 
prevail over restraining forces that encourage 
abandonment (Brockner and Rubin, 1985). These 
competing forces create a conflict over whether to 
continue or withdraw. The forces that encourage 
persistence include the size of the reward for goal 
attainment, the cost of withdrawal, and the 
proximity to the goal. 
 
The empirical study by Conlon and Garland 
(1993) suggests that the completion effect 
associated with approach avoidance theory may 
have a more pronounced impact on escalation 
behavior than the sunk cost effect. 
Escalation may be more 
common in the presence of 
the forces promoting 
persistence, including the 
proximity of the goal. 
Agency 
Theory 
Kanodia, Bushman, 
and Dickhaut, 1989 
 
Keil, Mann, and 
Rai, 2000 
 
 
 
Harrison and 
Harrell, 1993 
Agency theory focuses on the relationship 
between someone who delegates work (the 
principal) and another individual (the agent) who 
performs that work. Escalation behavior occurs as 
the agent follows a course of action that is in the 
agent’s best interest, but is irrational from the 
principal’s perspective. 
 
Through a laboratory experiment, Harrison and 
Harrell (1993) showed that subjects are more 
likely to continue a failing project in the 
experimental condition when they were 
manipulated to believe that they possessed private 
information about the project's likelihood of 
success and that a decision to terminate the project 
would damage their reputation. These findings 
were interpreted to be consistent with an agency 
theory view of escalation. Subsequent studies 
have yielded similar results (Harrell and Harrison, 
1994). 
Agency theory implies that 
there is a conflict of interests 
between the principal and the 
agent. Escalation  occurs 
when the decision to continue 
the project is rational for the 
agent due to reputation-
protection or monetary 
concerns. Escalation is 
rational for the agent, but 
irrational for the firm. 
 
Bandit Theory Chulkov and Desai, 
2005 
Bandits are a class of decision-making problems 
that involve choosing one action from a set of 
available alternatives. In terms of project 
management, the firm selects from several 
alternative IT projects, each with its own 
distribution of risks and rewards. In this problem, 
only one technology choice may be implemented 
by the firm in every given period and only the best 
performing technology is kept by the firm. When 
facing the bandit problem, managers choosing a 
risky IT project with a high potential reward 
before a safer one are behaving optimally and in 
the firm’s interest. It is better to resolve the 
The bandit problem provides 
the incentive to invest in 
risky projects first, even 
when they are associated with 
negative feedback. Since the 
successful technology is kept 
by the firm, going for the 
safer options first will leave 
the high-risk high-reward 
projects unexplored. High-
risk projects may be 
associated with negative 
feedback, and thus with 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
 
 Research on escalation of commitment in general, and the escalation of MIS projects in particular has 
covered a wide area of psychological, organizational, and economic theories. Recent developments such as the 
process theories of escalation (Mahring and Keil, 2008) emphasize the complex nature of the escalation process. The 
factors that are responsible for escalation can be classified into two broad groups – the irrational escalation factors 
and the rational escalation factors. The former include determinants of escalation that is irrational for both the 
manager and the firm. The latter focus on the rational reasons to continue the project after negative feedback. Such 
reasons may make escalation rational for only the manager if there is a conflict between the manager and the firm as 
noted by the agency theory. We attempt to summarize the escalation determinants into a model of irrational 
escalation and a model of rational escalation. 
 
 
uncertainty about the innovative project first.  
 
Firms that face the bandit problem of technology 
choice may appear to engage in escalation, as 
following the optimal strategy in the bandit 
problem requires risky investment.  
escalation. Resolving 
uncertainty about these high-
risk projects is rational for 
the firm.  
Real Option 
Theory 
Benaroch and 
Kauffman, 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
Chulkov and Desai, 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tiwana, Keil, and 
Fichman, 2006 
 
 
Real options are embedded in a project when the 
decision maker has the opportunity but not the 
obligation to adjust the future direction of the 
project in response to external or internal events.  
Real options are common in MIS projects. 
 
Continuation of the project has value when there 
is uncertainty and new information about the 
project may be revealed. Failure to account for the 
real option value in a project is value-reducing for 
the firm as it may lead to mistakes in premature 
termination of projects when projects with real 
option value are labeled as cases of irrational 
escalation. 
 
Experimental data collected from managers in 123 
firms demonstrated that managers recognize and 
value the presence of real options.   
 
The various option types encountered in IS 
development include: the option to switch use - 
the opportunity to use the IS for an additional 
purpose from that for which it was originally 
intended; the option to change scale that allows 
the scope of the application to be extended or 
contracted in the future; the option to stage 
investments that exists when a project is structured 
as a series of incremental outlays that allows the 
project to be terminated when negative 
information about its prospects is revealed; the 
abandonment option that involves the opportunity 
to stop the project and redeploy resources without 
major negative effects on the firm; and the growth 
option that is associated with a project when an 
initial investment leads to a variety of potential 
additional investments in the future. 
 
Real option theory provides a 
sharp contrast to 
psychological and 
organizational theories of 
irrational escalation. Under 
the real option theory, 
continuing a project has value 
for the firm due to various 
real options associated with 
the project. Failure to account 
for real option value leads to 
premature termination of 
projects that still have value 
for the firm. Such projects 
may be labeled as cases of 
escalation, even though 
continuation of these projects 
is rational once the real 
option value is incorporated 
in the decision making. 
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Irrational Escalation Model 
 
In the irrational escalation model, continuation of the project is truly a mistake, as it is not in the best 
interest of either the firm, or the manager. The escalation phenomenon is often seen as a puzzle, as the best course of 
action after receiving negative feedback is to terminate the project. This view adopts the irrational approach to 
escalation. The meta-analysis of escalation studies identified six major theories that focus on the irrational forces 
behind escalation.  
 
The psychological theories include the self-justification, the approach-avoidance, and the prospect theory, 
as well as the closely related “sunk-cost effect”. The social and organizational forces behind irrational escalation 
include the norms for consistency and the presence of organizational inertia. Figure 1 summarizes the forces that 
contribute to irrational escalation. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Irrational Escalation Model 
 
 
In summarizing the factors that promote escalation, the irrational escalation model has important 
implications for the management of information systems projects. Once the firm understands the forces that 
contribute to irrational escalation, the problem of IT project waste may be mitigated. The process of stopping 
escalated projects and reversing escalation, known as de-escalation, is characterized by the recognition of the 
problem, re-examination of the project, and search for alternative options (Monteleagre and Keil, 2000). De-
escalation has been associated with such factors as the change in the management of the project and improved 
governance mechanisms including monitoring and regular evaluations of the project’s progress (Keil and Robey, 
1999). Among others, Kim and Park (2007) indicate that an important determinant of de-escalation is the presence 
of control mechanisms such as the Capability Maturity Model (CMM).  
 
De-escalation techniques should be emphasized for projects that exhibit the presence of escalation factors 
identified in Figure 1, including the personal responsibility of managers for both the project selection and project 
Irrational 
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continuation decisions, the potential for negative framing of decision options due to large sunk costs, the large size 
of organization and the presence of organizational inertia. If the project development encounters one or more of 
these escalation factors, application of de-escalation techniques is warranted and may lead to improvement in project 
development success rate and the reduction of waste due to escalation errors. 
 
Rational Escalation Model  
 
An important insight from the meta-analysis of escalation studies is the fact that some escalation in the 
sense of continuation of a project following negative feedback is in the best interest of the firm. Escalation is 
rational if it is justified by the value that the firm receives from investigating the project further. Keil and Mann 
(1997) report that a large share of IS projects, as many as 40 percent, are associated with some degree of escalation. 
It is difficult to argue that so many IS projects involve irrational errors in judgment. Some of these cases of 
escalation may be rational for the firm. The real option theory and the bandit theory provide examples when project 
continuation is justified by the value of information and the value of flexibility that the firm receives from 
continuing the project.  
 
In contrast, the agency theory focuses on the conflict of interest between the agent (manager) and the 
principal (firm). The decision to continue the project may be irrational for the firm, but rational for the manager. 
One reason is provided by the need to protect reputation. The manager in charge of the project is often the first to 
discover the project’s true chances for success. If the manager finds out that the project is failing and terminates the 
project that he or she earlier selected, this would signal that a mistake was made. The reputation of the manager 
would be damaged. If the future wages and career concerns of the manager depend on this reputation, there is an 
incentive to continue the project (Kanodia et al., 1989). Another source of incentives to continue the project is the 
nature of incentives for the agent. If the agent is compensated based solely on the performance of the project, than 
there is the incentive to conceal negative information and delay termination of the project, as the compensation of 
the agent would be reduced by any action that reveals negative information. This provides the rationale for 
compensating managers based on their decision process, and not only on the outcome. 
 
 
Figure 2: Rational Escalation Model 
 
 
 When the projects at the firm are associated with factors that promote irrational escalation, as discussed in 
Figure 1, the use of de-escalation mechanisms may improve the performance of the firm. However, aggressive 
application of de-escalation techniques may lead to the termination of projects that may ultimately turn out to be 
successful. Figure 2 summarizes the factors that are associated with rational escalation and highlights the factors that 
may provide value for the firm and make project termination premature. First, the real option theory suggests that 
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future flexibility adds value to the project. The real option theory applies when there is uncertainty about the project, 
and continuing the project may yield new information or provide future growth opportunities for the firm. In this 
case, escalation in the sense of continuing the project is optimal for the firm, and a termination will be premature. 
Second, the bandit theory implies that the sequential nature of investigating alternative technological solutions yields 
value for trying the high-risk high-reward projects first. This result depends on the design of the bandit problem in 
which the firm chooses between several alternative technologies under conditions of uncertainty. The critical feature 
is that only one technology choice is implemented by the firm each period and only one is ultimately used. The 
optimal solution for the bandit problem involves investigating high-risk high-reward technologies fully before 
opting for a low-risk low-reward solution. De-escalation mechanisms that guide managers toward low-risk projects 
may not be in the best interest of the firm as they will cause high-reward projects to remain unexplored. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Escalation of commitment is commonly defined as continuation of a project after receiving negative 
feedback. Such escalation has been explored in a variety of experimental and empirical studies, and is especially 
common in MIS projects, with as many as 40 percent of all projects exhibiting some degree of escalation (Keil and 
Mann, 1997; Keil et al., 2000). We present a meta-analysis of escalation studies, and conclude that the literature on 
escalation may be separated into two broad groups – the studies of irrational escalation and the theories of rational 
escalation that lead to project continuation patterns even following negative feedback. 
 
We present the model of irrational escalation and the model of rational escalation in order to summarize the 
factors that promote each type of project continuation decisions. The examination of the irrational escalation model 
leads to a better understanding of the forces that contribute to irrational escalation, and helps alleviate the problem of 
IT project waste. If the irrational escalation factors are present in the decision making process involving an MIS 
project, then de-escalation techniques should be utilized, including a change in the management of the project, 
rotation of duties, and improved governance mechanisms such as monitoring and regular evaluations of the project’s 
progress. De-escalation techniques should be emphasized for projects that exhibit the presence of escalation factors 
identified in the irrational escalation model, including the responsibility of the same manager for both the project 
selection and project continuation decisions that creates proneness to self-justification, the potential for negative 
framing of decision options due to large sunk costs, the large size of organization and the presence of organizational 
inertia. If the project development encounters one or more of these escalation factors, application of de-escalation 
techniques may lead to improvement in project development success rate and the reduction of waste due to 
escalation errors. 
 
The rational escalation model highlights the fact that some escalation is rational and is in the best interest of 
both the manager and the firm. The real option theory and the bandit theory provide examples when project 
continuation is justified by the value of information and the value of flexibility that the firm receives from 
continuing the project. The agency theory involves escalation that is rational for the manager, but not the firm. 
Reputation protection and the attempt to escape lower compensation due to the termination of a project may lead the 
manager to continue a project after negative feedback as long as there is informational asymmetry and the principal 
of the firm discovers the project status with some delay. Understanding of the incentives behind rational escalation 
allows the firm to promote project management practices that are in the best interest of the firm.  
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION 
 
Mayur S. Desai earned Ph.D. in Business Computer Information Systems from University of North Texas. He spent 
nine years at Indiana University Kokomo before joining Texas Southern University. His research interests include 
end-user development, ethics in information systems, and managing information systems. 
 
Dmitriy V. Chulkov is the Associate Professor of Economics and Management Information Systems at Indiana 
University Kokomo. His research interests include the economics of escalation in management information systems, 
and economics of information. Dr. Chulkov earned his doctorate from the Krannert Graduate School of Management 
at Purdue University.  
 
International Journal of Management & Information Systems – 2009 Volume 13, Number 2 
36 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Abdel-Hamid, T. K. (1988) Understanding the '90% Syndrome' in Software Project Management: A 
Simulation-Based Case Study. The Journal of Systems and Software, 8 (4), 319-330. 
2. Arkes, H., Blumer, C. (1985). The Psychology of Sunk Cost. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 35, 124–140. 
3. Benaroch, M., Kauffman, R. (1999) A Case for Using Real Options Pricing Analysis to Evaluate 
Information Technology Project Investments, Information Systems Research, 10 (1), 70-86. 
4. Brockner, J. (1992) The Escalation Of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward Theoretical 
Progress. Academy of Management Review, 17 (1), 39-61. 
5. Brockner, J., and Rubin, J. (1985) Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analysis, 
Springer-Verlag: New York. 
6. Chulkov, D. and Desai, M. (2008). Escalation and Premature Termination in MIS Projects: The Role of 
Real Options. Information Management and Computer Security, 16 (4), 324-335. 
7. Chulkov, D. and Desai, M. (2005) Information Technology Project Failures: Applying the Bandit Problem 
to Evaluate Managerial Decision Making. Information Management and Computer Security, 13 (2), 135-
143. 
8. Conlon, D., Garland, H. (1993) The Role of Project Completion Information in Resource Allocation 
Decisions. Academy of Management Journal, 36 (2), 402-413. 
9. DeMarco, T. (1982) Controlling Software Projects. Yourdon Press: New York. 
10. Drummond, H. (1994) Too Little Too Late: A Case Study of Escalation in Decision Making. Organization 
Studies. 15 (4), 591-607. 
11. Garland, H. (1990). Throwing Good Money after Bad: The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Decision to 
Escalate Commitment to an Ongoing Project. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 728–731. 
12. Garland, H., Sandefur, C., Rogers, A. (1990) De-Escalation of Commitment in Oil Exploration: When 
Sunk-Costs and Negative Feedback Coincide. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 721-727. 
13. Harrell, A., Harrison, P. (1994) An Incentive to Shirk, Privately Held Information, and Managers' Project 
Evaluation Decisions. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19 (7), 569-577. 
14. Harrison, P., Harrell, A. Impact of 'Adverse Selection' on Managers' Project Evaluation Decisions. 
Academy of Management Journal, 36 (3), 635-643. 
15. Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1979) Prospect Theory: Analysis of Decisions under Risk. Econometrica, 47, 
263-291. 
16. Kanodia, C., R. Bushman, Dickhaut, J. (1989) Escalation Errors and the Sunk Cost Effect: An Explanation 
Based on Reputation and Information Asymmetries. Journal of Accounting Research, 27 (1), 59-77. 
17. Keil, M. (1995) Pulling the Plug: Software Project Management and the Problem of Project Escalation. 
MIS Quarterly, 19 (4), 421-447. 
18. Keil, M., Mann, J. (1997) The Nature and Extent of IT Project Escalation: Results From a Survey of IS 
Audit and Control Professionals. IS Audit and Control Journal, 1, 40-48. 
19. Keil, M., Mann, J., and Rai, A. (2000) Why Software Projects Escalate: An Empirical Analysis and Test of 
Four Theoretical Models. MIS Quarterly, 24 (4), 631-664. 
20. Keil, M. and Robey, D. (1999) Turning Around Troubled Software Projects: An Exploratory Study of De-
escalation of Commitment to Failing Courses of Action. Journal of Management Information Systems, 15, 
(4), 63-87. 
21. Kim, E., Park, Y. (2007) Prediction of IS Project Escalation Based on Software Development Risk 
Management. Journal of Information & Knowledge Management, 6 (2), 153-163. 
22. Mahring, M. and M. Keil (2008) Information Technology Project Escalation: A Process Model. Decision 
Sciences, 39 (2), 239-272. 
23. Monteleagre, R. and Keil, M. (2000) De-escalating information technology projects: Lessons from the 
Denver international airport. MIS Quarterly, 24 (3), 417-447. 
24. Newcombe, T. (1998) Big Project Woes Halt Child Support System. Government Technology, Feb. 1998, 
34-35. 
25. Rubin, J., and Brockner, J. (1975) Factors Affecting Entrapment in Waiting Situations: The Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern Effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 1054-1063. 
26. Standish Group (2004) CHAOS Report 2004,  https://secure.standishgroup.com/reports/reports.php 
International Journal of Management & Information Systems – 2009 Volume 13, Number 2 
37 
27. Staw, B., (1976) Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of 
Action. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16, 27-44.  
28. Staw, B. (1981) The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action. Academy of Management Review, 6, 
577-587. 
29. Staw, B. and Ross, J. (1980) Commitment in an Experimenting Society: An Experiment on the Attribution 
of Leadership from Administrative Scenarios. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65, 249-260. 
30. Tiwana, A., Keil, M., Fichman, R. (2006) Information Systems Project Continuation in Escalation 
Situations: A Real Option Model, Decision Sciences, 37 (3), pp. 357-391. 
31. Whyte, G. (1986) Escalating Commitment to a Course of Action: A Reinterpretation. Academy of 
Management Review, 11 (2), 311-321. 
32. Zmud, R. W. (1980). Management of large software efforts. MIS Quarterly, 4, 45–55. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Management & Information Systems – 2009 Volume 13, Number 2 
38 
NOTES 
